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Abstract
This study investigates how the changes in labour market conditions and economic 
growth were associated with fertility before and during the Great Recession in 
Europe in 2002–2014. In contrast to previous studies, which largely concentrated 
at the country level, we use data for 251 European regions in 28 European Union 
(EU) member states prior to the withdrawal of the United Kingdom in January 2020. 
We apply three-level growth-curve model which allows for a great deal of flexibil-
ity in modelling temporal change while controlling for variation in economic con-
ditions across regions and countries. Our findings show that fertility decline was 
strongly related to unemployment increase; this relationship was significant at dif-
ferent reproductive ages. Deteriorating economic conditions were associated with 
a stronger decline in fertility during the economic recession as compared with the 
pre-recession period. This evidence suggests the salience of factors such as broader 
perception of uncertainty that we could not capture in our models and which rose 
to prominence during the Great Recession. Furthermore, strongest fertility declines 
were observed in Southern Europe, Ireland and parts of Central and Eastern Europe, 
i.e. countries and regions where labour market conditions deteriorated most during 
the recession period. In Western Europe, and especially in the Nordic countries, fer-
tility rates were not closely associated with the recession indicators.
Keywords Fertility · Economic recession · Economic uncertainty · Europe · 
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1 Introduction
The global Great Recession that started in autumn 2007 in the USA has hit 
almost all European countries, with many experiencing falling gross domestic 
product (GDP) and rising unemployment for most of the period of 2008–2013. 
The recession has destroyed many jobs, put a downward pressure on wages and 
induced a huge strain on government budgets, often resulting in spending cuts 
on social policies and families (OECD 2014). Previous economic recessions fre-
quently led to fertility declines and stimulated fertility postponement (Sobotka 
et  al. 2011; Cherlin et  al. 2013). In particular, rising unemployment rates were 
associated with fertility declines that often took place with a time lag of one to 
two years (Simó Noguera et al. 2005; Berkowitz King 2005; Aaberge et al. 2005: 
150; Adserà 2005, 2011; Neels et al. 2013).
Most of the evidence on fertility changes in Europe after 2008 is in line with 
the past findings on pro-cyclical fertility. The increase in the period total fertility 
rates (TFRs) that started around the turn of the century has peaked in 2008–2010. 
Thereafter, fertility rates declined or levelled off in most European countries, 
especially among young women below age 25, accelerating the postponement of 
births to higher reproductive ages (Goldstein et al. 2013; Lanzieri 2013; Comolli 
2017; Comolli et al. 2019). Altogether, 16 countries experienced a TFR decline 
by 0.1 or stronger between the year the TFR peaked in 2008–2011 and 2013. The 
fertility decline was more pronounced in countries and regions that experienced 
stronger economic downturns and faster increases in unemployment, especially 
in Southern Europe (Lanzieri 2013). However, fertility rates dropped also in the 
Nordic countries, which experienced rather mild economic decline (except in 
Denmark) and which continued providing extensive welfare and family policies 
(Comolli et al. 2019).
The majority of research on the consequences of the Great Recession on fertil-
ity in Europe has been descriptive (Lanzieri 2013) or confined to single countries 
(e.g. Pailhé and Régnier-Loilier 2015; Cazzola et al. 2016; Hilamo 2017; Kotza-
manis et al., 2017). Few studies, which adopted a broader comparative perspec-
tive, demonstrated that an increase in unemployment during the economic reces-
sion was associated with declining fertility rates in Europe, especially at younger 
ages (Goldstein et al. 2013; Belido and Marcén 2016; Comolli 2017). These stud-
ies remained limited to country-level data, however.
Our study aims to expand the understanding of the links between economic 
conditions and fertility rates, focusing especially on the period of the  Great 
Recession in Europe. Our main contribution is threefold. First, we investigate 
the links between changing economic and labour market conditions and fertil-
ity at sub-national level, providing a finer-grained contextual perspective than the 
research based on cross-country comparisons. Such approach allows us to cap-
ture changes in local employment and economic conditions in addition to coun-
try-specific conditions. It is also consistent with the previous research, which 
showed that both country and regional contexts can shape demographic and fam-
ily processes, as they often differ in terms of jurisdiction, culture and economic 
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conditions (Klüsener et  al. 2013; Lappegård et  al. 2017). The focus on smaller 
regions allows us also to account for sub-national diversity in the pre-recession 
economic conditions as well as the timing, severity and duration of the economic 
recession. Second, we explicitly focus on the fertility implications of changing 
economic and labour market dynamics, whereas most of the existing studies 
model the links between economic conditions and fertility. We are able to achieve 
these two objectives by employing a novel analytical approach—a three-level 
growth-curve model. It offers a flexible way of modelling change in the dependent 
variable after accounting for the interdependency of observations nested within 
the higher-level units (regions and countries). It thus allows us to investigate the 
links between labour market dynamics and fertility, while controlling for the vari-
ation in economic conditions across regions and countries. Finally, we also assess 
which changes in economic and employment conditions contributed most to the 
observed fertility decline during the recession.
2  Economic Decline in Europe in 2008–2013
Deteriorating economic conditions are manifested by declining economic activity, as 
captured by a fall in the GDP, falling consumer confidence and adverse labour mar-
ket trends. Worsening labour market conditions typically lead to stagnation or even 
decline of wages, higher incidence and persistence of unemployment and a spread of 
more uncertain employment forms. The labour market situation of young adults usu-
ally deteriorates most quickly as they tend to have lower qualifications, little work 
experience and poorly protected work contracts (Bruno et al. 2016). They are thus 
first to be laid off and last to be employed, which results in a rapid increase in youth 
unemployment (UN 2011). In addition, some young adults give up searching for a 
job altogether, expanding the ranks of those who neither work for pay nor participate 
in educational or training schemes (Scarpetta 2010), the so-called NEET (see, e.g. 
OECD 2016).
The economic recession, which started in 2008, affected the whole European 
continent. In its first phase, in 2008–2009, the economic output fell sharply in all 
parts of Europe. Subsequently, the economic trends varied between countries and 
regions. In some countries, a gradual economic recovery has taken hold since 
2010, while other countries, especially in Southern Europe, experienced renewed 
economic downturn in 2010–2013. This second phase of the recession was partly 
fuelled by government austerity measures (House et  al. 2017), which were moti-
vated by declining tax incomes and rapidly rising levels of public debt.
The economic downturn was particularly severe in Southern Europe and in some 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), especially in the Baltic countries, 
Bulgaria, Croatia or Hungary, where it was either very strong initially or lasted par-
ticularly long. Economic output also fell sharply in Ireland. In five Southern Euro-
pean countries (Cyprus, Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain), GDP per capita con-
tracted by over 10% in the period 2008–2013; in Greece the decline was as large 
as 32%. Economic contraction of more than 10% was also recorded in Ireland, Lat-
via, Croatia and Slovenia (Eurostat 2017). The falling economic output had severe 
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repercussions for the labour market. Unemployment rates rose sharply, with the three 
Baltic countries (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia), three Southern European countries 
(Cyprus, Greece and Spain) and Ireland experiencing double-digit increase in unem-
ployment rate. Moreover, the recession also precipitated a sustained growth in long-
term unemployment lasting 12 months or more.
Young adults below age 25 were hardest-hit by deteriorating labour market condi-
tions. Their unemployment increased abruptly and even doubled or tripled in some 
of the countries, mainly in Southern Europe and in CEE (i.e. in the Baltic countries, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovenia) and Ireland (OECD 2014 and 2016). The worsening 
situation of young adults is also reflected in an increase in the proportion of NEET. 
In Cyprus, Greece, Spain and Ireland, this proportion nearly doubled, but it also 
increased substantially in other Southern European and some of the CEE countries 
(Romania, Latvia, Croatia). The cuts in government expenditures disproportionally 
lowered spending on younger people and contributed to increases in poverty among 
children and young adults (OECD 2014: 112–113).
Only few European countries were relatively unscathed by the recession. Among 
them, Poland did not experience a single year of declining GDP in 2008–2013, three 
out of the five Nordic countries (Finland, Norway and Sweden), Belgium, France, 
Luxembourg and Malta saw only minor increases in unemployment and the three 
German-speaking countries (Austria, Germany and Switzerland) recorded very mild 
recession. Germany even displayed a decline in unemployment.
The dynamics of economic recession varied strongly not only between countries, 
but also at sub-national level. Several countries (UK, Germany, Bulgaria, Slovakia, 
Austria and Germany) had both regions which experienced overall a positive eco-
nomic growth over 2008–2013 and regions where the economic output was shrink-
ing heavily. For instance, in the UK the economy declined by more than 10% in two 
regions and at the same time it grew by around the same amount in North Eastern 
Scotland (Crescenzi et  al. 2016). Youth unemployment changed in an even more 
diverse way: while it increased in most of the European regions, some countries 
experienced rising joblessness among the youth in some regions and declining in the 
others (e.g. Austria, Belgium, Czechia, France, Hungary, Norway, Sweden, UK and 
Slovakia). Regions differed not only with respect to the severity of the recession, 
but also in  its timing and duration. For example, Northern Italian regions, which 
are more integrated with the global economy, were more strongly affected in the 
short term than Southern Italy where recession was milder at first, but was more pro-
tracted and its impact intensified with time (Crescenzi et al. 2016).
3  Economic Downturn and Fertility: Past Research and Key 
Objectives of our Study
The economic decline directly affects many families and individuals by lowering 
their income, but also by fuelling general perceptions of uncertainty about future 
economic conditions (Kreyenfeld 2010; Kreyenfeld et  al. 2012; Raymo and Shi-
bata 2017; Vignoli et al. 2012, 2016; Ayllón 2019), even among those who are not 
directly affected by massive lay-offs or company bankruptcy (Sobotka et al. 2011; 
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Hofmann et  al. 2017). Consistently with the theoretical model developed by Ran-
jan (1999), young adults may avoid making long-term commitments—such as 
buying a flat, forming a union or having a child—in uncertain times. Instead, they 
may decide to live longer with their parents and prolong their education to increase 
their qualifications, escape unemployment and improve their position in the labour 
market (Kohler et al. 2002; Aassve et al. 2007). On the other hand, some couples 
may respond to higher economic uncertainty by having children, using temporary 
unemployment and lower wages as an opportunity window characterized by low 
opportunity costs of parenting, especially for the mothers (Butz and Ward 1979). 
In addition, women who lost their job may aim to have a child to improve their self-
confidence and social status (Friedman et al. 1994).
All in all, the individual fertility responses to economic uncertainty are con-
tingent on a wide range of circumstances and normative constraints and are likely 
to vary by age, sex and social status as well as by broader institutional conditions 
including welfare and family policies (Kreyenfeld 2010; Schmitt 2012; Vignoli et al. 
2012, 2019). However, a vast body of research based on aggregate-level data shows 
that fertility is pro-cyclical and tends to fall when economic conditions deteriorate 
(Sobotka et al. 2011), suggesting that during the economic downturns most people 
tend to postpone childbearing rather than use the period of uncertainty to form a 
family. For instance, studies on the effects of the Great Depression of the 1930s 
demonstrated that a rapid surge in unemployment was followed by a drastic fall in 
fertility (Kiser and Whelpton 1953) and some of the births, presumably postponed 
during that era, have actually never taken place (Cherlin et al. 2013). Other studies, 
which cover the second half of the twentieth century, confirmed that young adults 
are more likely to postpone family formation during economic downturns (Neels 
et al. 2013; Hofmann et al. 2017) and even provide evidence for the negative effects 
of adverse labour market conditions experienced in young age for completed fertility 
(Currie and Schwandt 2014). The persistence of joblessness proved to be strongly 
negatively associated with fertility intentions (Busetta et  al. 2019) and behaviour 
(Ciganda 2015), even in the aftermath of the Great Recession, when economic 
recovery was not immediately followed by creation of new jobs.
The effects of the recent economic recession on family formation have been 
widely studied in the USA. Schneider (2015) showed that deteriorating economic 
conditions and increasing uncertainty at a state level, manifested especially by rising 
unemployment and foreclosure rates, resulted in a decline of general fertility rate by 
7.5%. Economic downturn contributed to an increase in childlessness by lowering 
first birth rates among women in their late thirties (Comolli and Bernardi 2015). 
Schneider and Hastings (2015) found that unemployment had the strongest negative 
impact on fertility of low-educated unmarried women. In addition, Seltzer’s (2019) 
research revealed a longer-term negative influence of labour market polarization, 
with deindustrialization and job displacement among middle-skilled workers fuel-
ling sustained fertility declines that persisted after the economic recession ended.
Research for Europe was initially limited, but expanded in recent years. Some 
studies were descriptive (Lanzieri et al. 2013) or confined to single countries (Pailhé 
and Régnier-Loiler 2015; Cazolla et al. 2016; Hilamo 2017; Tragaki and Bagavos 
2019). Other studies adopted a broader comparative perspective, mostly based on 
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country-level data. Bellido and Marcén (2016) investigated changes in total fertility 
in response to an increase in unemployment using a pooled sample of 30 European 
countries over the period 1991–2013. Goldstein et al. (2013) looked, in addition, at 
changes in age-specific fertility rates by birth order, but covered only the first stage 
of the economic recession until 2010. Comolli (2017) extended the study by Gold-
stein et al. (2013) using longer time series and a wider selection of economic indica-
tors. These studies demonstrated that an increase in unemployment during the eco-
nomic recession was associated with declining fertility rates in Europe, especially at 
younger ages. In addition, Comolli (2017) showed that fertility responded negatively 
to changes in consumer confidence. A detailed study of the Nordic countries by 
Comolli et al. (2019) revealed a uniform negative fertility response to the economic 
recession across countries and education groups, which contrasted with the more 
differentiated fertility developments by social group in the previous periods of eco-
nomic downturns. Ayllón’s (2019) research, combining individual-level data with 
regional (NUTS-1) indicators of unemployment, precarious employment and sub-
jective indicators of job uncertainty, is to our knowledge the only recent European 
comparative study on fertility change that analysed sub-national data. Objective 
indicators of job insecurity, in particular unemployment and long-term unemploy-
ment, were more strongly linked to fertility than subjective indicators of job percep-
tions, which varied by context.
Previous studies focused also on investigating the links between economic condi-
tions and fertility (e.g. Schneider 2015; Ayllón 2019; Seltzer 2019). This “static” 
design may distort the perceptions of the effects of economic changes on fertility, as 
the reported effects may result from the long-term differences between countries and 
regions as well as from the economic dynamics over time. As such, they blend two 
important and distinct questions, “Do economically worse off regions have lower 
fertility rates?” and “What is the impact of deteriorating economic conditions on 
fertility?”, together. Equally theoretically important is the question whether fertil-
ity responses to changing economic conditions are nonlinear and generally stronger 
during the recession period, possibly due to rising anxiety, uncertainty and negative 
expectations, even among the people not directly affected by the recession (Sobotka 
et al. 2011).
Our study thus builds upon previous research, aiming to expand the understand-
ing of the links between economic conditions and fertility in several directions and 
taking into account the shortcomings of previous research. In particular, we aimed 
to (i) better account for both the local conditions and the country context than most 
of the past studies which focused on a national level only; (ii) focus on the fertility 
consequences of changing economic and labour market dynamics rather than sim-
ply studying the links between economic conditions and fertility; (iii) investigate 
whether fertility responses to changing economic conditions strengthened during 
the recession period; and (iv) assess which changes in economic and employment 
conditions contributed most to the observed fertility decline during the recession. 
To this end, we implement a three-level growth curve model, which allows us to 
account for national and sub-national context and separate the effects of changes in 
economic conditions on fertility from the cross-regional associations between the 
two variables.
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4  Data and Indicators
Our selection of data and indicators aimed to provide a wide coverage of Euro-
pean countries and sub-national regions to capture the effects of the changes in 
local economic conditions on fertility. We used data for NUTS-2 regions, which 
are roughly equally populated (population 0.8–3 million), and they are the small-
est units for which we could access comparable and reliable data on fertility and 
economic conditions for the analysed countries. As of January 2017, there were 
276 NUTS-2 regions in the 28 EU countries including United Kingdom.
To measure fertility, we used the TFR, complemented by its age-specific com-
ponents—cumulative age-specific fertility rates (ASFR) computed for the age 
groups 15–19, 20–24, 25–29, 30–34 and 35+. These data, published by Euro-
stat at the NUTS-2 level since 1999 onward, are computed by combining national 
vital statistics on births by age of mother and official data and estimates on 
female population by age. While birth registration is complete or almost complete 
in Europe, the fertility rates may be underestimated and the fertility time series 
can be distorted by series breaks and jumps in some countries due to incomplete 
registration of migration (especially outmigration) and inconsistent and changing 
rules on the registration of births to women who left the country. These problems 
are most pertinent in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe with sizeable 
outmigration (especially Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the 
three Baltic countries), therefore, our findings for these countries should be inter-
preted with caution.
To measure the changing economic and labour market conditions, we use eco-
nomic and labour market indicators, which closely reflect the economic cycle 
and which indeed deteriorated during the Great Recession. The selection of our 
explanatory variables was limited by data availability and reliability. First, we 
considered a range of labour market measures which indicate the instability of 
employment and persistence of joblessness, such as unemployment rate (overall 
unemployment and youth unemployment at ages below 25) and the proportion in 
long-term unemployment (unemployment lasting 12 months or more). These indi-
cators originate from the European Labour Force Survey (ELFS), which is a com-
parative large-sample survey designed for collecting labour market data of high 
quality. These data are available in Eurostat Database as annual aggregate indica-
tors provided for the NUTS-2 units for the period since 1999. Unfortunately, the 
database did not provide data on temporary employment at the NUTS-2 level.
Second, we accounted for the proportion of young adults (aged 18–24) not in 
employment, education or training (NEET), also collected in ELFS. The NEET 
indicator was criticized in the literature for being heterogeneous and consisting 
not only of the unemployed and disengaged, but also young care providers, per-
sons with health problems and disabilities as well as persons who are actively 
involved in artistic activities or self-directed training (Cavalca 2016). In North-
ern and Western Europe, the NEETs are mostly the short-term unemployed, in 
Southern Europe this group includes mainly the long-term unemployed and dis-
couraged workers and in CEE countries it includes many women with family 
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responsibilities (Eurofound 2016). Despite this diversity, the NEET indicator is 
an essential tool for a better understanding of the vulnerability of youth in terms 
of their labour market participation and risk of social exclusion (Eurofound 
2016). In our view, an increase in the share of NEETs, observed during the eco-
nomic recession, suggests an increase in youth disengagement during that time. 
Furthermore, the high share of NEET population signals an exposure to informal 
work, insecure and low wage employment in future (Furlong 2006). Finally, we 
included the annual rate of GDP decline as it can be considered as a proxy of 
the general economic prosperity and economic trends. To this end, we used data 
on GDP at current prices in EUR, which is available in Eurostat since 2000. We 
converted it into local currencies using the average annual exchange rates and 
adjusted it for inflation using the harmonized index of consumer prices. Next, we 
computed relative annual regional GDP growth rates for the years 2001–2014.1
We lagged the economic and labour market indicators by one year.2 Our data-
set therefore consists of the series of labour market and economic indicators for the 
years 2001–2013 and the series of fertility indicators for the period 2002–2014. 
Out of the 276 NUTS-2 regions in the EU-28 countries, we excluded ten overseas 
territories, which often differ widely in their cultural and institutional characteris-
tics from the European regions. Further, we excluded data for another 16 regions 
and used the data for the whole Slovenia instead of its two NUTS-2 regions. These 
regions were excluded due to boundary changes or missing labour market indicators 
(see Appendix 1 for the list of omitted regions).
Overall, our sample comprised 251 NUTS-2 regions, nested within 28 coun-
tries. In this dataset, fewer than 5% of observations per variable are missing and 
fewer than 8% are classified by Eurostat as low reliability values. However, vari-
ables based on small populations, i.e. the youth unemployment rate and long-term 
unemployment, contain more missing values (10–11% of all observations) and low 
reliability values (22–24%) (for details see Appendix 2). In order to minimize the 
number of missing values, we imputed the data with a cubic spline interpolation. We 
performed this imputation only if there were no more than four missing values in a 
row and if they were part of the time series, preceded and followed by known values.
All indicators we considered show a sharp deterioration in economic condi-
tions after 2007, especially in 2009. According to the conventional indicator of 
GDP growth, the economic recession was over by 2013, with more than half of the 
regions registering positive GDP change. However, the labour market indicators 
1 We also considered using indicators of economic deprivation and social exclusion (i.e. severe material 
deprivation, the proportion of people at risk of poverty and social exclusion and at-risk-of-poverty rate). 
However, we did not include them as they are not available at the NUTS-2 level for the whole analysed 
period and they are based on small survey samples, suffering considerable year-to-year fluctuations.
2 This is probably the most common lag, accounting for the duration of pregnancy (around 9 months) 
and a few months’time for women and men to react to changing economic conditions. Individual studies 
apply a time lag typically ranging up to 2 years. Aggregate correlations between GDP growth and fertil-
ity change across highly developed countries betwen 1956 and 2008 were much stronger when one-year 
lag rather than two-year lag was applied (Sobotka et al 2011: 294, Table A1). However, for individual 
countries, two-year lags often gave stronger correlation than one-year lag (ibid., Table A2).
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such as unemployment rate and long-term unemployment still increased in most 
regions in that year. Finally, the TFR trends show a reversal of fertility across most 
regions after 2007, but at the same time fertility rates did not become more differen-
tiated across regions.
5  Model
Our data have a hierarchical structure. Year-observation units are nested within 
regions and regions are nested within countries. Using these data, we estimated 
three-level growth-curve models (GCMs) with regional TFR and ASFRs as depend-
ent variables. The GCM offers a flexible way of modelling change in the depend-
ent variable after accounting for the interdependency of observations nested within 
higher-level units (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012). The functional form of the 
pattern of change in the dependent variable and the parameters describing the 
change (intercepts and slopes) can be set to vary across the studied subjects. Fur-
thermore, the GCM allows for investigating the effects of the subjects’ characteris-
tics (both time-constant and time-varying) on the change in the dependent variable 
and the effects of the time-varying characteristics can be set to vary across subjects. 
This means that using the GCM we can model the association between the change 
in regional economic conditions and the developments in regional fertility by allow-
ing the trend parameters to vary across regions or countries and accounting for the 
dependency of the observations within NUTS-2 regions and countries. We can also 
investigate how the relationship between economic conditions and fertility varies 
across higher-level units, in our case NUTS-2 regions or countries.
We used the mixed-effect approach to growth-curve modelling which fits the 
GCM within a regression framework. This approach is better suited to modelling 
growth in one observed outcome variable, time-unbalanced data and models with 
more than two nesting levels than the alternative latent curve approach, usually fitted 
with structural equation models (Steele 2008; McNeish and Matta 2018). Our GCM 
originates from the following simple specification:
where FRcrt denotes TFR or cumulated ASFRs in country c, region r at time t; 0 
stands for the overall intercept; and j are the slopes in the piecewise linear spline 
which is used for modelling the time trend in fertility in j a priori defined intervals. 
We set the nodes of the piecewise linear splines at the end of 2008 and 2010, i.e. 
the time points when we observed a change in fertility trend in most of the analysed 
countries. The Xicrt−1 denotes the economic or labour market indicator i measured 
in country c, region r at the time t-1, i.e. lagged by one year. In all models, Xicrt−1 
represent the unemployment rate, proportion of long-term unemployed, the share of 
NEET as well as the GDP growth. The correlations between these economic indi-
cators do not exceed 0.7 (and usually are smaller than 0.5), which allowed us to 
introduce all economic indicators into one model without risking multicollinearity 








i ⋅ Xicrt−1 + crt i = 1, 2, 3, 4, j = 1, 2, 3
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problems. We also confirmed that multicollinearity is not a problem by computing 
the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF), which appeared to be lower than 2.5 on most 
of our major explanatory covariates (see Appendix 1 in the online supplementary 
material). The unemployment rate at ages 20–64 enters the model for the TFR, the 
youth unemployment rate (ages 15–24) is included in the models for ASFR at ages 
15–19 and 20–24 and the unemployment rate of persons aged 25–64 is included in 
the models for ASFR at ages 25–29, 30–34 and 35+. All economic indicators are 
centred at the sample grand mean to facilitate the interpretation of our findings.
The model in Eq. 1 informs us how the overall variation in economic conditions 
(within regions, between regions within each country and between countries) is cor-
related with the overall variation in fertility rates, but does not allow us answering 
the question how the within-region change in economic conditions affects the 
change in regional fertility. In order to provide the answer to the latter question, we 
decomposed the variation in a variable Xicrt−1 into the within-region variation (
Xicrt−1 − Xicr⋅
)






where Xicr⋅ denotes the average level of variable Xi in a country c and region r 
(regardless of time), and Xic⋅⋅ stands for the average level of variable Xi in a coun-
try c. Furthermore, the model in Eq. (1) does not yet account for the country- and 
region-specific variation in initial fertility levels, trend parameters and fertility 
responses to changes in economic conditions. Implementing Eq.  (2) into (1) and 




 constitutes the main coefficient of our interest. It denotes the within-region effect 
of economic conditions on fertility and tells us by how much fertility increased/





 , inform us about how the between-region within-
country and between-country variation in economic conditions relate to the within-
country and between-country variation in fertility rates. They thus denote associ-
ations between economic conditions and fertility within the country and between 
countries and constitute control variables for our main variables of interest.
Country- and region-specific idiosyncrasies are modelled with a series of ran-
dom terms. The random intercepts 0c and 0r represent country- and region-
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between-country variation in the initial fertility. The random slopes jc and ic rep-
resent country-specific shifts in the spline slopes j and the within-region effects of 
economic conditions WR
i
 , respectively, and allow for the cross-country variation in 
fertility developments over time and cross-country variation in fertility responses to 
changes in economic conditions. The covariances between the random effects turned 
out to be insignificant and thus were set to zero.3 We decided to introduce the ran-
dom slopes at the country level instead of the NUTS-2 level to be able to conclude 
how the regional effects aggregate into country-level effects.
Finally, crt constitutes the level-1 residual. We allowed for the serial autocorrela-
tion of the level-1 residuals. The order of the autoregressive process was selected 
for each model separately: the residuals in the model for the TFR required an intro-
duction of the AR(3), which means that error terms three periods away from each 
other were correlated. Models for the age-specific fertility rates required the AR(2), 
although for modelling fertility at ages 20–24 and 25–29 we had to use the AR(1) as 
the models using higher-order correlation faced convergence problems. The model 
expressed in Eq. (3) is our final model. As it is quite complex, we have also speci-
fied more parsimonious models, e.g. random intercept models with and without a 
decomposition into within-region, between-region within country and between 
country variation, or a fixed-effects model. These models do not account for the 
hierarchical structure of our data (fixed-effects model), country-specific variation in 
fertility responses to changes in economic conditions (all alternative specifications) 
or country- and region-specific unobserved time-invariant characteristics (random-
intercept models without a decomposition). Indeed, they display a weaker fit to the 
data (see Appendix 2 in the online supplementary material) and thus were rejected 
in favour of the model in the Eq. (3). 
6  Empirical Findings
Our model provides estimates of within-region (WR
i
) as well as between-region 
within-country effects (BRWC
i
) of economic conditions on fertility. The results 
confirm that both between-region within-country differences as well as changes in 
economic conditions over time are related to fertility. To keep our study focused, 
however, we do not discuss the correlations between the economic conditions 
and fertility across regions. Instead, we focus on the estimates of the association 
between the change in economic conditions and changes in fertility, which address 
our research objectives. To provide a comparable perspective on the effects of indi-
vidual components of economic and labour market changes, we present average 
annual changes in fertility rates, which would be observed in a hypothetical situa-
tion if unemployment rate, share of long-term unemployed and the share of NEET 
3 It was not possible to estimate a model with all random effects and their correlations. We have, how-
ever, estimated models with several combinations of random effects and the correlations were mostly 
insignificant. We also examined the AIC and BIC of the models with and without the correlations and 
the two statistics clearly suggested to use the more parsimonious models.
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increased by 10 percentage points (pp.) and the annual rate of GDP growth declined 
by 10 pp. Finally, to obtain a more realistic picture of fertility responses to chang-
ing economic conditions, we predict total fertility in 2009–2014 under five scenar-
ios. The discussed findings are displayed graphically, while the full model estimates 
are presented in Appendixes 3 and 4.
6.1  Changes in economic conditions and fertility dynamics
The deterioration of economic and labour market conditions was related to fertility 
decline across all reproductive ages, including higher reproductive ages when fur-
ther postponement of fertility may limit the chances for future pregnancy (Fig. 1). 
Fertility decline was most strongly associated with an increase in unemployment. 
Our model, as specified in Eq. (3), predicted that a hypothetical increase in unem-
ployment rate by 10 percentage points (pp.) would lead, on average, to a decline in 
total fertility by slightly more than 0.04, net of all other covariates we considered. 
The negative relationship between unemployment and fertility was most significant 
at younger age groups (below age 30).
An increase in the proportion of long-term unemployed was also significantly 
related to fertility decline at all ages except for the youngest age group (15–19). 
Fertility response to an increase in long-term unemployment was, however, much 
weaker than to an increase in overall unemployment rate.
Changes in the remaining two economic indicators—the rate of GDP decline and 
the share of NEETs—were only weakly related to changes in fertility when con-
sidered jointly with unemployment rate and long-term unemployment. Stepwise 
Fig. 1  Absolute change in total fertility rate (left panel) and cumulated age-specific fertility rates (right 
panel) resulting from the 10  pp. increase in unemployment rate, % long-term unemployment and % 
NEET and 10 pp decline in GDP growth. NUTS-2 regions in EU-28, 2001–2014. Note: Unemployment 
rate in the model for total fertility refers to the age group 20–64, in the models for fertility at ages 15–19 
and 20–24 to the age group 15–24 and in the models for fertility at ages 25+ to the age group 25–64. P 
value: *−  0.1, **−  0.05, ***−  0.01
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analyses showed that the GDP decline and the change in the share of NEETs were 
losing their association with fertility after we accounted for unemployment and 
long-term unemployment. This suggests that worsening of economic conditions is 
related to fertility mainly through employment-related conditions.
6.2  Fertility Responses to Changing Economic Conditions Before and During 
the Great Recession
In order to evaluate whether the correlation between changing economic conditions 
and fertility was stronger during than before the recession, we interacted the within-




 with the recession dummy, 
set at 1 in the period 2008–2014 and 0 otherwise. Our findings largely support this 
hypothesis:  deteriorating economic conditions were associated with a stronger 
decline in total fertility during the economic recession as compared with the pre-
recession period (Fig. 2). The decline in the GDP and an increase in the share of 
NEETs, which were not related to changes in the TFR before the recession, turned 
out to depress it after 2007. Furthermore, the negative association between changes 
in long-term unemployment and total fertility became slightly stronger. The negative 
relationship between unemployment and the TFR remained equally strong before 
and during the recession.
Why are the fertility reactions to changing economic and labour market condi-
tions stronger during the economic recession than before? Is it because the relation-
ship between economic conditions and fertility is nonlinear? For instance, Garfinkel 
et al. (2016) found that Americans react more strongly to deterioration in economic 
conditions than to their improvement. Furthermore, it is also possible that a worsen-
ing in economic conditions is particularly detrimental for fertility at high levels of 
unemployment or low levels of economic growth (or economic decline). We 





 with (a) a dummy denoting whether the economic indica-
tor i was increasing (as opposed to remaining stable or declining)4 (b) a dummy 
Fig. 2  Absolute change in total 
fertility rate resulting from the 
10 pp. increase in unemploy-
ment rate, % long-term unem-
ployment and % NEET and 
10 pp. decline in GDP growth 
within NUTS-2 regions in two 
periods: before (2001–2008) 
and during (2009–2014) the 
economic recession. Note: see 
Fig. 1
4 To construct this variable, we smoothed the economic indicators to extract the trend and get rid of 
year-to-year fluctuations in economic indicators.
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denoting whether the economic indicator was exceptionally high, e.g. above the 
regional average (versus staying below or at the regional average) (see the results 
in Appendix 4). We found no support for the hypothesis that fertility reacts more 
strongly to a worsening rather than an improvement in economic conditions. Neither 
did we find evidence that economic downturn is more strongly related to fertility 
decline when the initial conditions are poor than when they are good. Overall, our 
findings suggest that economic conditions had a stronger impact on fertility after 
2008 than before due to an accumulation of negative economic developments (some 
of which may not have been captured by our model) and, we reckon, a general 
increase in uncertainty about the future. We elaborate on this in the concluding 
discussion.
6.3  The Links Between Changing Economic Conditions and Fertility Dynamics 
by Country
Our empirical strategy allows us also to investigate variation in post-2008 fertil-
ity effects by country. To this end, we computed the empirical Bayes predictions 
of the random slopes ic and their variances. We obtained the country-specific fer-
tility effects by summing the average within-region effect WR
i
 with the predicted 
Fig. 3  Absolute change in TFR resulting from the 10  pp. change in economic conditions by country, 
2009–2014. 90% CI
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country-specific parameters ic . The variance of the country-specific effects was 
obtained in a similar way. Our findings are presented in Fig.  3a–d. Many of the 
obtained effects are only marginally significant as the number of countries in our 
study is relatively small. Despite this shortcoming, our findings are consistent with 
analyses we performed on country groups (Matysiak et al. 2018), except for the CEE 
countries for which this study revealed a substantial heterogeneity. Most of the pre-
dicted associations are negative, and, consistent with our findings discussed above, 
unemployment and long-term unemployment play the strongest role. Furthermore, 
fertility effects of changing economic conditions are strongest (and often significant) 
in countries which were most strongly hit by the economic recession, especially in 
Southern Europe (Greece, Portugal, Spain, Malta) and some of the Central and East-
ern European countries (Romania, Bulgaria, Czechia, Slovakia, Latvia, Estonia). 
Declining GDP, which displayed no significant correlation with fertility on average, 
clearly contributed to fertility decline in some of the Southern European countries 
(Greece, Malta, Portugal), CEE countries (Latvia and Romania) and  in the UK. 
Finally, significant fertility reactions are identified in the Netherlands and Germany. 
The latter was only weakly affected by the economic crisis and unemployment there 
was declining during the recession period.
6.4  Fertility responses to the actual changes in economic conditions
So far, our analysis has focused on discussing how fertility changes were associated, 
on average, with a hypothetical 10 pp. change in each of the indicators of economic 
conditions we considered. Such hypothetical changes often differ widely from the 
actual dynamics in economic and employment conditions in individual regions. To 
obtain a more realistic picture of fertility responses to changing economic condi-
tions, we predict total fertility in 2009–2014 under five scenarios, out of which the 
first four are hypothetical. To this end, we use our model presented in Eq. (3) with 




 and the recession dummy, which proved to be essential. The first 
scenario, “no-recession scenario” (S1), predicts TFR as if there was no recession 
and economic conditions remained constant at 2007 level (prior to the economic 
recession). Subsequently, we predict the TFR allowing for actual changes in unem-
ployment (S2), unemployment and long-term unemployment (S3), and unemploy-
ment, long-term unemployment and the GDP (S4). Finally, the “Full model” (S5) 
predicts the change in total fertility based on the observed changes in the complete 
set of indicators. The latter scenario was computed not only for the recession period, 
but also for the pre-recession years. This strategy allows us to compare the observed 
TFR with the TFR predicted by our model and verify in this way its validity.
In the first step, we compare the actual TFR with the TFR predicted under S5 
(in which all economic indicators assume their actual values). It turns out that our 
model predicts the actual TFR very well. The absolute difference between the pre-
dicted and actual TFR does not exceed 0.05 in 55% of cases and is smaller than 
0.1 for 84% of observations in our sample. The distribution of the average regional 
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absolute differences (Appendix 5) reveals that large differences are not geographi-
cally clustered, but are evenly distributed across the continent.
Next, we map the maximum difference between predictions from scenarios S1 
(no recession) and S5 (predicted TFR given the actual economic conditions) for all 
analysed regions in 2009–2014 (Fig.  4). This comparison allows us to assess the 
maximum fertility effects of the actual change in economic indicators considered 
in our model. For most regions, the difference was largest during the last two years 
analysed, 2013 and 2014. Regions in the UK and in the Baltic countries, where eco-
nomic recession was strong but relatively short, as well as Finnish, Swedish and 
some of the Polish and Romanian regions experienced the strongest fertility effects 
in earlier years. The shades of red, observed in most of the regions, demonstrate 
the maximum decline in fertility, resulting from a worsening in economic condi-
tions, while the shades of grey display the maximum increases in fertility, resulting 
from an improvement in economic conditions. The latter are displayed for regions 
where no fertility decline took place during the recession. These regions form a 
large cluster in Central Europe, encompassing most of German and Polish regions 
and several regions in Belgium, Czechia as well as the Vienna region in Austria. 
This should not come as a surprise, as Poland did not experience economic decline 
around 2008–2010 and most other countries in the region saw relatively mild eco-
nomic recession. The recession-related fertility decline was strongest in Southern 
Europe. The total fertility would be by 0.15 or more higher in most of the Greek 
regions and by 0.10–0.15 higher in most of the Spanish and Portuguese regions if 
economic conditions had not changed after 2007. Substantial fertility decline due 
to economic recession was also recorded in Ireland and in  some of the Eastern 
European regions, especially in Latvia (by 0.22) and in most of the Bulgarian and 
Fig. 4  Predicted changes in the TFR due to the economic recession, 2009–2014, NUTS-2 regions of the 
EU-28 including UK
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Fig. 5  Observed and predicted total fertility rate under scenarios S1–S5 by country, 2002–2014
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Croatian regions. In other parts of Europe, recession-induced fertility decline was, 
however, small if it took place at all.
Most countries experienced relatively little regional variation in recession-
induced fertility declines. However, there were notable regional differences within 
and across countries, including larger fertility increases in eastern Germany as com-
pared with western Germany and an East–West gradient in fertility change in Poland 
(with fertility increases due to positive economic conditions mostly concentrated in 
the western part of the country). In addition, there were relatively large regional dif-
ferences in recession-related fertility declines in several strongly affected countries, 
especially Greece, where the recession-induced TFR change ranged from − 0.11 in 
Ionian Islands to − 0.20 in Crete.
Finally, we investigated which economic factors contributed most to fertility 
decline during the recession. To this end, we compared total fertility predicted 
under the no-recession scenario to the  total fertility predicted under scenarios 
S2–S5 (i.e. after allowing stepwise for actual changes in unemployment, long-
term unemployment, GDP decline and NEETs). We present our findings in 
Fig. 5a–g for countries, where fertility effects were the strongest—Greece, Spain, 
Portugal, Latvia, Bulgaria and Ireland. In addition, we also display fertility devel-
opments in Germany, where fertility increased during the recession period and 
unemployment declined. We do not present the country-level predictions for the 
remaining countries, because fertility reactions to the changes in economic con-
ditions are so small there that the predicted fertility rates from scenarios S1–S5 
largely overlap (these figures are available upon request).
Our findings suggest that fertility decline was associated with an increase in unem-
ployment and in Southern Europe and Latvia, in addition, with economic decline as 
measured by falling GDP. A different pattern was observed only in Ireland, where 
fertility decline was largely associated with an increase in long-term unemployment. 
In Germany, where an increase in fertility was recorded, it was achieved mainly in 
association with falling unemployment rates during the recession.
6.5  Robustness checks
Our findings have passed several robustness checks. First, we verified whether lagging 
our economic indicators by one year is sufficient to capture fertility reactions to chang-
ing economic conditions. To this end, we introduced a two-year lag (t-2) in economic 
indicators in addition to the one-year lag (t-1) incorporated in our model. Results are 
displayed in Appendix 3 in the online supplementary material. Even though changes 
in some of the economic indicators at t-2 turned out to be significantly related to fertil-
ity (this was mainly the case of unemployment rate), introducing them into the model 
did not change the significance or the direction of the estimated coefficients at t-1 in 
the vast majority of cases.5 Furthermore, the BIC statistic clearly showed that the more 
parsimonious models, with lags at t-1 only, displayed a better fit.
5 The exceptions were the models for ASFR 20–24 and 30–34, in which the GDP decline at t-2 turned 
out to predict fertility better than the GDP decline at t-1, but at the same time exactly the reverse was 
observed in the model for ASFR 25–29.
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Second, we verified whether the imputation of missing values could have affected 
our findings. To this end, we re-estimated our models using the pre-imputation data-
set. Hardly any changes have been observed in our findings (see Appendix 4 in the 
online supplementary material).
7  Concluding discussion
The Great Recession had a long-lasting impact on income, employment, health, 
well-being and family behaviour of Europeans. Our main focus was on investigat-
ing how economic and labour market dynamics relate to fertility dynamics while 
controlling for the variation in economic conditions between regions in each country 
and between countries. We covered a range of economic and labour market indica-
tors to capture the multifaceted configuration of the economic recession and explore 
huge sub-national variation in its progression. To that aim, we have incorporated 
long-term unemployment and the share of young adults who are not in education, 
employment or training. Our models, including the full set of indicators, provided a 
close fit to the actual fertility trends in most of the sub-national regions in Europe.
Three general findings are consistent across wider groups of countries and are also 
in line with the past findings reported at a national level. First, the periods of economic 
downturns are associated with negative fertility dynamics across the countries and 
regions analysed. Second, the role of unemployment and long-term unemployment 
clearly dominates over the other economic indicators studied, which suggests that 
worsening economic conditions relate to fertility mainly through deteriorating labour 
market. In particular, changes in unemployment rate showed the strongest link to fer-
tility dynamics across all ages: an increase in unemployment rate by 10 pp was associ-
ated, on average, with a decline in total fertility by nearly 0.04 in absolute terms. In 
addition to unemployment, GDP decline was closely associated with fertility decline 
in Southern Europe and Latvia. Third, fertility rates were negatively linked with dete-
riorating economic conditions across the whole range of childbearing ages, including 
late reproductive ages when women who postpone childbearing may not be able to 
realize their fertility plans later in life. The latter finding suggests that economic reces-
sion might have affected not only the timing of fertility, but also its quantum.
We were able to provide a finer picture of the factors associated with fertility 
dynamics in individual countries and sub-national regions in Europe. Our results 
suggest that country context played a dominant role in recession-related fertil-
ity declines, as fertility change was strongly differentiated by country and in most 
countries, the regional variation in recession-related fertility change was relatively 
low. This is in line with large between-country differences in the severity of the eco-
nomic recession and policy responses to it. Yet, there was notable regional varia-
tion in several countries, especially in Greece, as well as broader clusters of similar 
recession-induced fertility changes (or the lack of them) spanning across country 
boundaries, especially in Central Europe, where the recession was mild. Our model, 
which controls simultaneously for sub-national and country effects (regions are 
nested within countries) and accounts at the same time for the levels and changes 
in economic/labour market conditions, arguably constitutes an improvement to the 
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models used in the past. We show that across Europe, both between-country and 
within-country variations in economic conditions are relevant for understanding fer-
tility dynamics. The between-country dimension proved to be especially relevant, in 
agreement with the results of other recent studies (Klüsener et al. 2013; Lappegård 
et al. 2017; Fox et al. 2019). In particular, our findings are most informative for the 
countries and regions that experienced most severe economic setbacks, i.e. Southern 
Europe as well as in parts of Central and Eastern Europe. In the regions of Greece, 
Spain and Portugal, deteriorating economic and labour market conditions affected 
the period TFR by − 0.08 (Basque country in Spain) to − 0.20 (Crete in Greece) 
between 2007 and 2014 compared with the “no-change” scenario. This decline was 
largely attributable to an increase in unemployment and GDP decline. These factors, 
especially unemployment and long-term unemployment, also played a dominant role 
in fertility decline in Central and Eastern Europe.
The negative effects of GDP decline and of the rising share of NEETs as well 
as long-term unemployment were more pronounced during the recession period in 
2008–2014. This strengthening of the negative influence of economic conditions on 
fertility during the recession did not result from the fact that Europeans adjust their 
fertility more strongly to the worsening rather than improvement of economic con-
ditions (as it has been found for the USA). Moreover, in Central Europe and in the 
Nordic countries fertility rates were not closely associated with the recession indi-
cators. This suggests that our indicators have tapped into the factors we could not 
capture in our models and which rose to prominence during the recession. These 
include rising poverty and economic deprivation, lower income, and also wider 
structural changes in the labour market characterized by falling opportunities for the 
middle-income workers and the spread of lower-paid temporary contracts (Adsera 
2017; Seltzer 2019). Our findings may also reflect a specific period effect when 
economic uncertainty diffused across Europe, fuelled by negative expectations and 
declining confidence about the future, not captured in our data. Sobotka et al. (2011) 
emphasized the role of expectations regarding future negative economic trends that 
may result in feelings of anxiety and depression, in shaping fertility. In this context, 
individuals’ perceptions of the broader economic climate, including media coverage 
of the economy, might increase uncertainty and affect fertility (Vignoli et al. 2020). 
We hope our results will stimulate future research in which this hypothesis is explic-
itly tested.
Our study has limitations. First, it is difficult to evaluate whether the observed fertil-
ity declines were mostly driven by the temporary postponement of childbearing during 
uncertain times or rather by a fall in the underlying level (quantum) of fertility that 
will also depress completed family size of women who were in prime reproductive 
ages around 2010. Even though the declines in fertility of women aged 35+ suggest 
some lasting influence on fertility levels among women approaching the end of their 
reproductive lives, these effects are rather small. Second, the range of available eco-
nomic and labour market indicators is more restricted at a sub-national level, prevent-
ing us from delving deeper into different possible links between economic downturn 
and fertility. In addition, some survey-based indicators turned out to be too uncertain 
and unstable at the level of NUTS-2 regions. Third, our study does not consider the 
role of education as a potent moderator of the association between adverse economic 
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circumstances and fertility trends. Clearly, the idea that all social groups are equally 
vulnerable to economic uncertainty is both logically thin and empirically tenuous 
(Kreyenfeld 2015). Finally, the role of changing labour market conditions during the 
Great Recession cannot be solely ascribed to (long-term) unemployment. In many 
countries, an increasing number of people—the emerging class of “precariat”—are 
facing uncertain lives, moving in and out of low-paid “stopgap” jobs that may give lit-
tle meaning to their lives (Standing 2011). Like in the USA (Seltzer 2019), this group 
might have contributed strongly to the unexpected and puzzling continuation of fertil-
ity decline during the period of post-recession recovery in 2014–2018 in many Euro-
pean countries including the Nordic countries (Comolli 2019) and most of Western 
Europe (except Austria, Germany and Switzerland) (VID 2018), which took place dur-
ing the time of declining unemployment and solid economic growth.
Economic uncertainty has become an intrinsic feature of contemporary glo-
balizing world, and the relationship between economic conditions and family 
dynamics is to remain a major topic of public interest in the years to come. The 
challenge for future research will be to integrate better macro- and micro-level 
evidence on the impact of economic uncertainty on family behaviour and to 
address the economic uncertainty/fertility nexus from a life-course perspective, 
considering a broader set of social, economic, policy and cultural factors.
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Appendix
Appendix 1: NUTS‑2 regions excluded from the analysis
Out of the 276 NUTS-2 regions in the European Union as of January 2017, 24 
regions were excluded from our analysis and two regions of Slovenia were replaced 
by one region covering the whole country, leaving our analysed sample with  251 
regions.
The list of excluded regions is as follows:
(1) Overseas territories with distinct socioeconomic set up, not directly comparable 
to European regions (10 regions).
• France (5 regions): NUTS-2 regions covering French overseas departments: 
Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guyane, La Réunion and Mayotte.
• Portugal (2 regions): Azores (Região Autónoma dos Açores) and Madeira 
(Região Autónoma da Madeira).
• Spain (3 regions): Ceuta (Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta), Melilla (Ciudad 
Autónoma de Melilla) and Canary Islands (Canarias).
(2) Regions with important boundary shifts during the analysed period (4 regions).
• Slovenia (2 regions): due to boundary shifts in 2006 between the two 
NUTS-2 regions in the country (eastern Slovenia and western Slovenia), we 
did not analyse these regions separately and considered the whole country as 
one region.
• UK (2 regions): two regions with boundary changes in 2010: Cheshire and 
Merseyside.
(3) Regions with missing time-series data on labour market indicators or GDP for 
the analysed period (12 regions).
• Austria (4 regions): Burgenland, Carinthia (Kärnten), Salzburg and Vorarl-
berg.
• Finland (1 region): Åland islands.
• France (1 region): Corsica (Corse).
• UK (6 regions): Inner London West, Inner London East, Outer London East 
and North East, Outer London South, Outer London West and North West, 
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